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Commentary:
A Response to Professor Friedman
The Evolution of the Hearsay Rule

to a Rule of Admission
Ronald J. Allen*
The hearsay rule in its early form was a broad rule of exclusion, the justifications of which were virtually indistinguishable from those generally given for the Anglo-American
adversarial process. The hearsay rule encouraged trials to be
joined upon evidence presented by the parties in open court
through witnesses testifying from present memory to first-hand
knowledge, and thus available to be tested through cross-examination. But the rule, the system, and their justifications all developed during rude and simple times. With rare exceptions,
trials involved quite local events in virtually every respect: the
acts and the actors (parties and witnesses) were of the locale.
Consequently, there was very little need for complex rules concerning the form of evidence. Those with personal knowledge
either decided the case themselves or could be called to the bar
to provide their evidence with relatively little inconvenience.
The cases were not very complicated; they did not call for the
multitude of witnesses and blizzard of paper that so characterizes contemporary litigation.
Centuries later, the conditions have changed. Although
specifying the paradigm case of litigation is not easy, it very
well may possess an intercity, if not interstate, aspect. In addition, the typical case may entail at least some complexity that
can be dealt with only through rules permitting untraditional
forms of evidence, evidence other than testimony from a witness with first-hand knowledge. Moreover, even if the modal
case of litigation is not all that different from that of centuries
ago, the distribution of cases is much more widely scattered.
There are today too many complex cases involving evidence
*

Professor of Law, Northwestern University.
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from large geographical areas to allow the simple case to set
the rules for the entire system as a whole.
As the nature of litigated cases has changed, so too have
the rules of evidence. Untraditional forms of evidence are increasingly common in litigation. Perhaps the best example is
the proliferation of the use of various kinds of experts, but
there are many other examples. The Frye rule1 exists only in
theory as a restriction on new types of evidence, and the common law relevancy rules largely have been swept away through
the adoption of rules modeled on Article IV of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 2
Notwithstanding all this change, the hearsay rule remains
and looms large, surviving as perhaps the last bastion of the
traditional conception of the Anglo-American form of trial.
Even its twin pillar, party presentation of evidence, has been
under assault through the combined force of managerial judging, the explicit power of judges to call and examine witnesses
(still infrequently used, however), the advent of alternative
forms of dispute resolution, and the shifting of substantial adjudicatory power to (or locating it in) administrative agencies.
But the hearsay rule has stood its ground even though the
ground under its feet has been eroding.
Or has it?
The positive argument for the proposition is made quite
simply. All rules of evidence in our country, to my knowledge,
have a hearsay rule, for which Article VIII of the Federal
Rules apparently has become the paradigm. 3 Courts deal with
hearsay daily, commentators focus attention on the rule
through a complex and apparently never ending literature, and
evidence classes spend considerable time learning the rule's
contours. That the rule exists, is implemented by courts, discussed by commentators, and taught in law schools is a powerful argument for its vibrancy.
There is a contrary argument, however, and it is more compelling than its competitor: The activity surrounding the hearsay rule is less evidence of its vibrancy than part of its death
throes. Although the many exceptions to the hearsay rule are
1. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that an
expert's scientific testimony had to have achieved general acceptance within
the scientific community before it would be admissible in evidence).
2. Article IV of the Federal Rules of Evidence addresses "relevancy and
its limits." See FED. R. Evin. 401-412.
3. Article VIII of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides the guidelines
on hearsay. See FED. R. EvID. 801-806.
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often noted, little attention has been paid to the conceptual inroads made to the rule by discovery systems. In civil cases typically, and increasingly in criminal cases, forms of discovery are
supplanting the hearsay rule.4 For example, in federal litigation, any witness outside the subpoena power of the district
court may be deposed, and the deposition, although obviously
hearsay, may be used at trial.5 Under normal discovery rules
testimony also may be perpetuated for those within the subpoena power, and again, if used, the form of testimony will be
hearsay. Somewhat more noted is that what discovery rules
have done for witnesses, the hearsay rule6 has done for parties
by excluding from hearsay the admissions of party opponents. 7
Thus, it is only a marginal overstatement to say that today, at
least in civil cases, the hearsay rule applies in any robust fashion only to available nonparty witnesses within the subpoena
power of the court.8
And it does not apply to them very rigorously. There are
numerous exclusions from the definition of hearsay, twentyseven formal exceptions, 9 and two provisions explicitly encouraging the ad hoc creation of exceptions, 10 an encouragement, it
Moreover,
should be noted, of which much has been made.'
hearsay exceptions, once formed, remain. To my knowledge,
there are virtually no examples of hearsay exceptions being
eliminated; the dynamic is one of ever-increasing scope for the
exceptions. In another assault on the hearsay rule, some courts
4. Perpetuating testimony in criminal cases is becoming more common,
for example. Under Rule 801(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Evidence, testimony given before a grand jury may be admitted if inconsistent with a witness's trial testimony. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(1). Under Rule 804(b)(1),
testimony at a preliminary hearing also may be admissible at trial. FED. R.
EVID. 804(b)(1).
5. See FED. R. CiV. P. 32(a)(3); FED. R. Evm. 804(b)(1).
6. I will now shift to focusing solely on the Federal Rules of Evidence.
7. See FED. R. EvID.801(d)(2).
8. As the text implies, this is a bit of an overstatement, but not much of
one. For example, under the rules so far discussed, a party may not rely on its
own statement, but of course that is hardly ever necessary because the party
will be there to testify. In any event, given all the exceptions to the hearsay
rule which I will discuss in the text, a party often can rely on its own state-

ment. Criminal cases are different because of the Confrontation Clause and
the crude systems of discovery.

9. See FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(23), 804(b)(1)-(4).
10. See FED. R. EviD. 803(24), 804(b)(5).
11. There are probably thousands of cases admitting evidence under the
residual exceptions. The difficulty in counting these cases is compounded by
the fact that not all decisions are reported, nor are all examples litigated to an

opinion.
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now are requiring that expert testimony be provided in affidavit form, requiring, rather than forbidding, hearsay. The hearsay rule is, in short, no longer a rule of exclusion; it is instead a
rule of admission that is doing its subversive work under the
cover of darkness. Article VIII of the Federal Rules purports
to continue the common law development of hearsay in most
respects, but it is a false promise. The Federal Rules, in concert
with modem discovery principles, are quite clearly the harbin12
ger of its demise.
My instinct is that it is a death well-deserved, and after a
burial suitable to its station, the hearsay rule should be allowed
to lie quietly, undisturbed, for eternity. Given all the inroads
into the rule, it no longer can seriously be contended that the
rule contributes in any robust way to substantial justice. 13 To
be sure, an occasional case will turn on hearsay, and occasionally justice might be done because of exclusion for reason of
hearsay, but against this must be balanced the probability that
without a hearsay rule the evidence would have been excluded
under some other rule, most likely relevancy. Further to be
considered in the balance are cases of injustice resulting from
the exclusion of hearsay as well as the astounding cost of maintaining the rule.
The cost of maintaining the rule is not just a function of its
contribution to justice. It also includes the time spent on litigating the rule. And of course this is not just a cost voluntarily
borne by the parties, for in our system virtually all the cost of
the court-salaries, administrative costs, and capital costs-are
borne by the public. As expensive as litigation is for the parties, it is supported by an enormous public subsidy. Each time a
hearsay question is litigated, the public pays. The rule imposes
other costs as well. Enormous time is spent teaching and writing about the hearsay rule, which are both costly enterprises.
In some law schools, students spend over half their time in evidence classes learning the intricacies of the hearsay rule, and,
as the Minnesota Hearsay Reform Conference demonstrates,
enormous academic resources are expended on the rule.
Like other social practices, the hearsay rule should be required to pull its own freight; only if its costs are justified
12. This is a task apparently pursued directly by the drafters of the rules.
For example, proposed Rule 804(b)(2), dealing with statements of recent perception, would have liberalized further the hearsay rule. See FED. R. EvID. 804
advisory committee's note (discussing proposed Rule 804(b)(2)).
13. I put aside Confrontation Clause questions in criminal cases.
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should it be maintained. Of the three possible justifications for
the rule, one is implausible, one is somewhat scandalous, and
one has some but not much merit.
The implausible justification is the rule's standard,
although often implicit, rationale that somehow it contributes
to justice. Perhaps this was once true, but the world in which it
was has passed, and in our world no serious argument along
these lines can be made, most particularly for the reason already suggested: The hearsay rule today is more a rule of admission than exclusion. 14 Most hearsay comes in, and most that
does not would probably be excluded under other rules. The
power of this point is made evident by the complete lack in the
literature for over twenty years of any effort to provide a justification for the hearsay exceptions, taken as a whole. 15 No one
argues any more that the exceptions can be understood as
driven by a coherent mix of necessity and reliability, and no
one has any explanation but tradition for the administration of
the availability requirement. Accordingly, the hearsay exceptions, and thus the rule, make no sense from this point of view
unless seen as a step in the progression leading to the rule's
eventual demise.
The potentially scandalous justification is that maintaining
the hearsay rule protects the competitive advantage of those
who know it, a point that extends to practitioners and scholars
(and perhaps judges). Any complex set of rules, whether sensible or crazy, gives an advantage to the person who knows them;
they constitute a tool for the knowledgeable to use against the
less well-informed. The seasoned trial lawyer who knows the
procedural and evidentiary intricacies of the relevant law can
use that knowledge to good effect when competing at trial with
a less experienced opponent. Proposing the abolition of the
hearsay rule asks these individuals to give up this advantage, to
throw away all the time they have spent mastering the topic.
In addition, complex rules reduce competition by restricting entry to practice. Needless to say, the standard opposition from
the experienced trial bar to general reform of evidence law is
quite easy to understand. The point extends to academics.
Elimination of the hearsay rule would at a stroke make obso14. Again, I wish to avoid the emotional debate that surrounds Confrontation Clause problems in criminal cases.
15. "Exceptions" as defined in this Article includes both "exceptions" and
"exemptions."
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lete the learning of all who have mastered the topic, and would
make entry into the field by competitors easier.
The only meritorious justification for the hearsay rule is
that it limits judicial discretion. Elimination of the rule would
not mean that all evidence now subject to a hearsay argument
would be automatically admissible. Rather, it would mean that
judges would have to decide, primarily but not exclusively on
relevancy grounds, whether to admit evidence. That determination would be less rule-bound than the present treatment of
hearsay because it would focus generally on probative value
and prejudice. The point should not be pressed too far, however, for the residual exceptions giveth in some measure what
the rule-like structure of hearsay taketh away. Nonetheless,
the primary analytical issue for hearsay today is whether the
hearsay rule is a sensible specialized relevancy rule. That is
precisely what it has become, and that is how it must be
justified.
Moreover, the hearsay rule is a specialized relevancy rule
that, like its more general counterpart in Article IV, favors admission over exclusion. Thus, the deep question for hearsay is
whether its costs are justified given its contribution to rulebased relevancy decisions. I am skeptical that the answer is
yes, largely because I am convinced by the general policy of the
Federal Rules of Evidence to increase the flow of information
to the fact-finder, in part by the sweeping away of common law
relevancy rules. Those who wish to defend the hearsay rule, to
extend its final days, as it were, must, I think, develop a justification explicitly in relevancy terms, explaining why the structure of Article VIII is preferable over its domain to the
structure of Article IV-why, in other words, the policy of
sweeping away the highly articulated relevancy rules should
16
not extend to the last highly articulated relevancy rule.
I suspect that these preliminary remarks make it quite
clear why I am such an admirer of Professor Friedman's
work. 17 Professor Friedman purports to be attempting to rationalize the hearsay rule, to improve its functioning, but like
all praiseworthy efforts involving the hearsay rule, his work
contributes to its ultimate elimination. For that reason alone I
16.

The only other remaining candidate for a highly articulated relevancy

rule is the best evidence rule. See FED. R. EVID. 1001-1008 (describing the best
evidence rule and exceptions).
17. See Richard D. Friedman, Toward a PartialEconomic, Game-Theoretic Analysis of Hearsay, 76 MINN. L. REv. 723 (1992).
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would be enthusiastic, but there are many aspects of his paper
equally deserving of praise. In what follows, I first briefly describe some of these admirable characteristics. I then explain
how Friedman's analysis advances the noble cause of the destruction of the hearsay rule, and I will end with some constructive criticisms.
At the conceptual plane, Professor Friedman's article is an
interesting and complex work that combines the best of traditional forms of evidentiary scholarship with an approach that
continues the recent efforts to apply new analytical tools to evidentiary problems. Taken as a traditional paper, it is a very
useful catalogue of the ways hearsay might arise and of the subtle differences in the implications of the varying situations.
Friedman's well-constructed hypotheticals begin with simple
cases of hearsay and become increasingly complicated as the paper proceeds. His analysis of the hypotheticals is clear and informative. This paper undoubtedly will prove to be a very
effective pedagogical tool for introducing a number of the complexities of the hearsay problem.
The piece soon transcends pedagogy, however, primarily
through its masterly presentation of the tactical implications of
hearsay, and it is here that Friedman contributes to the recent
efforts to expand the analytical tools available for evidence
scholarship. Employing a microeconomic perspective in an accessible and attractively informal way, he analyzes the interaction of hearsay and trial tactics.18 His analysis is a substantial
contribution on two levels. It is, first, a very enlightening discussion of the secondary consequences of the hearsay rule, of
how the decision to admit or exclude evidence can affect the
relative position of the parties, and of how the parties might react. The details of his discussion are interesting in their own
right, but we are also in his debt for demonstrating the power
of microeconomic reasoning applied to common evidentiary
matters. To my knowledge, the only other area in which this
has been done is the confidentiality rules,19 and thus Friedman's analysis continues the very healthy infusion of new tools
18. Id. at 724, 727-50.
19. See Ronald J. Allen et al., A Positive Theory of the Attorney-Client
Privilege and the Work ProductDoctrine, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 359 (1990); Louis
Kaplow & Stephen Shavell, Legal Advice About Information to Presentin Litigation: Its Effects and Social Desirability,102 HARV. L. REV. 565 (1989). For
a lengthy replication of much of these two works, see Stephen Bundy & Einer

Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversary System? A General Theory of
LitigationAdvice and Its Regulation, 79 CAL. L. REv. 313 (1991).
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and perspectives into the field of evidence.2"
The primary conclusion that Friedman reaches is that the
hearsay rule is otiose, although I am not sure that he would
agree with that characterization. It is not how he explicitly
characterizes the implications of his work, but it is the article's
most powerful message. To see why that is so requires careful
attention to Friedman's subtle analysis; indeed, I suspect I am
enamored of this piece precisely because of its subtly subversive
nature.
Friedman first sets up the problem he wishes to address by
highlighting the inadequately considered question of the cost of
producing the live alternative to hearsay evidence. Employing
the microeconomic approach, he asserts, correctly I think, that
"[t]he court may conceive of its task as selecting the ruling that
has the greatest possible expected value."'2 ' As he points out in
a very helpful way, that task has three loci, for it requires comparisons between hearsay, no evidence, and a live witness. He
then proceeds to articulate the relevant criteria for the comparison, and here the careless reader may be led astray. The criteria are quite conventional: efficiency, distributive justice, and
fairness.22 However, the analysis of these criteria is quite unconventional. Friedman eventually concludes that the court
will lack sufficient information to make a reasoned choice
based on these variables: "In particular, the court probably will
have difficulty determining whether LT [live testimony] is sufficiently preferable for truth-determination purposes to H
[hearsay] and NE [no evidence] to warrant the cost of producing
the declarant."2 3 What is the alternative? This is Friedman's
most creative suggestion: "[I]ts [the court's] best approach is
generally to try to allocate the burden of producing the declarant in such a way that, consistent with fairness, the parties'
own self-interest will lead to an efficient result."2 4 Friedman
asserts that the court can implement his approach as long as it
20. One other quite provocative aspect of Friedman's article is that it
equates a favorable finding that probative value exceeds prejudicial impact
with a positive effect on truth determination (which, for purposes of this footnote, I will abbreviate as "relevant"). See Friedman, supra note 17, at 737-43.
This seems to me to raise quite profound and interesting questions. For example, quite clearly any discrete bit of evidence could be viewed as relevant but
nonetheless lead to wrongful results, given the evidentiary base as a whole.

21. I& at 735.
22. I& at 736.
23. Id. at 750. For a general discussion of Friedman's three criteria, see ici
at 736-48.
24. Id. at 751.
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can evaluate whether hearsay evidence is better than no evidence and has a general idea about the difficulty2 and expense
each party would face in producing the declarant. 5
At this point in Friedman's analysis, his critics may begin
to fear that they detect signs of Law Professor's Disease. 26 The
most common symptom of Law Professor's Disease is an extremely close and critical analysis of an unfavored position, followed by the assertion of some more favored alternative,27
which remains untouched by the ferocious critical capacity previously demonstrated by the author. If it so difficult for a court
to make a determination of the relative value of hearsay, Friedman's critics may wonder, why should we assume that the court
can make a determination of the relative difficulty and expense
for each party to produce the declarant? Do we have here, in
short, the pristine case of Law Professor's Disease: a critical
analysis followed by a set of sympathetic suppositions?
Other questions arise as well. Why in an efficiency analysis
does the criterion change from the parties' views of their own
costs to whether the court "has a general sense, which it believes to be accurate, as to how difficult and expensive each
party would find it to produce the declarant?" Isn't this mixing
apples and oranges? In any event, wouldn't the proper question
be whether the court was likely to be right in its assessment
rather than whether it merely believed itself to be correct? It
is part of the beauty of Friedman's analysis that these criticisms
do not matter, and thus are not criticisms. Explicating this
point, in turn, uncovers how Friedman's argument advances the
elimination of the hearsay rule.
In Friedman's analysis, the key variables are the probative
value/prejudicial impact determination and the cost of producing the declarant. The first of these is quite simple to implement. In Friedman's view, hearsay is virtually always more
probative than prejudicial if the underlying testimony would
have been so. 28 He does not analyze the inverse proposition,
but it follows a fortiori: if the live testimony would be more
prejudicial than probative, so too would be the hearsay. But
now, observe where we are. In Friedman's view, putting aside
the question of cost, hearsay should be admissible whenever the
25. Friedman's specific language asserts that the "court needs some, but
not necessarily full, information with respect to this factor." Id at 751.
26. I believe I am the first to isolate this as a distinct syndrome.
27. This is usually referred to in technical terms as the "Professor's Pet
Theory."
28. Friedman, supra note 17, at 752.
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live testimony would have been admitted, and should be excludable on traditional relevancy grounds whenever the live
testimony would have been excluded. This essentially collapses
hearsay to relevancy, or, in my view, recognizes that the collapse has already taken place.
Friedman's analysis of cost confirms the implications of his
analysis of probative value. He analyzes all the possible combinations of cost, and he concludes in every case save one that the
burden of producing the declarant should rest on the opponent
of the hearsay offer. Only when the physical burden is much
more easily satisfied by the proponent would the proponent
have to produce the declarant in order to use the hearsay, but
even here the financial burden would rest with the opponent.
Under Friedman's analysis, in virtually every case of hearsay, 29
the court will admit the evidence, and the opponent will have
to choose whether to expend resources in responding. This,
though, is precisely how a court handles virtually all evidentiary proffers at trial under the relevancy standard. If the judgment is made that the evidence is more probative than
prejudicial, the court admits the evidence, and the opponent
can respond as it chooses. Friedman's analysis thus collapses
hearsay to relevancy,3 0 with a pinch of best evidence principles
31
thrown in for good measure.
Friedman extends his analysis to cases where prejudice exceeds probative value, but this is unnecessary. If prejudice exceeds probative value, the court should exclude the evidence,
again on traditional relevancy grounds. 32 No more needs to be
said about the matter.
29.
30.

In fact, Friedman articulates only one exception.
The actual standard under Rule 403 prescribes that the testimony will

be admitted unless the prejudicial impact substantially outweighs the probative value. FED. R. EviD. 403. From my point of view, that is an insignificant
detail.
31. See Friedman, supra note 17, at 782 (analyzing a witness in court and a
criminal defendant who wishes to admit his or her own statement). These
passages create some ambiguity, and it is not clear to what extent Friedman is
arguing for an expanded best evidence rule.
32. In Green v. Back Laundry Machine Co., the Supreme Court held that
the Federal Rules of Evidence require a judge to permit impeachment of a
civil witness with prior felony convictions even though unfair prejudice might
result. 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1993-94 (1989). I do not think that the holding of Green
will be extended to hearsay; even if evidence is within a hearsay exception, it
still could be excluded on relevancy grounds. Friedman appears to imply that
hearsay which is more prejudicial than probative might be admitted. Friedman, supra note 17, at 782-83. I think that this is just a presentational ambiguity, although I am not sure.

19921

COMMENTARY

Thus, Friedman's analysis furthers the laudable goal of
burying the hearsay rule. AUL the necessary decisions concerning admissibility can be made through a combination of relevancy and best evidence principles; an independent hearsay
component is unnecessary. And thus it is that Friedman's analysis will be quite controversial, for its implications are highly
subversive of conventional understandings. As I feel a bond of
kinship with him on this particular issue--although, depending
upon how things go, a blood bond may turn out to be more descriptively accurate-I will now press ahead to certain minor
problems that I see in his text.
Given the revolutionary implications of his work, Friedman
may wish to insulate it from the burden of having to fight unnecessary skirmishes. In its present form, critics may advance a
number of points. The first of these takes us back to Law Professor's Disease. The present analysis is a curious mix of hard
and casual analysis. For the reasons already discussed, I doubt
this weakens Friedman's thesis, but aspects of it make him vulnerable to diversionary attacks.
For example, he purports to employ the rigors of a
microeconomic approach, and at one point he defends his argument about the probative value of hearsay by assigning substantial weight to empirical evidence: "More importantly, there is
no empirical support for the proposition that juries overvalue
hearsay substantially, much less that they overvalue it to... a
great degree."' sa This rigor is not always matched by the arguments in his favor, however. How do we know, for example,
how probative hearsay is?34 And why should we accept his assumptions about the court's ability to make a reasonable assessment of the relative costs of producing declarants? This is the
general objection that "what is good for the goose is good for
the gander," and I would urge Professor Friedman to respond
to it, just because for the most part it is a mere distraction from
his main thesis.-s
Friedman injects yet another ambiguity into the analysis
33. Friedman, supra note 17, at 739.
34. A critic may respond to Friedman by saying that his unadorned assertions should be empirically justified. See, e.g., id. at 740-43. If empiricism is to
be considered on one side of the equation, it should be considered on the other.
35. Friedman's cites to the new work on hearsay, see id. at 739 n.32, do not
address this point. They deal only with a small corner of the relevant universe, and they are rather preliminary. My main point, in any event is that
the use of empiricism at this point seems to be a bit premature, and it will encourage his critics to divert the discussion from analytics to empiricism.
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through his treatment of cases in which the hearsay is more
prejudicial than probative. At times, he implies that such evidence might be admitted,3 6 and at one point he even says that
hearsay more prejudicial than probative "is excluded unless
[the proponent] produces [the witness]." 37 But why should that
be so? If the evidence is more prejudicial than probative, why
should it ever be admitted?3 8 One possible explanation is that
Friedman does not conceive of his work as I do, as, in other
words, an attack on the hearsay rule, thus leaving open the possibility for some residual use of hearsay notions that escapes me
(and that would somehow favor the admission of prejudicial
material). That, too, might deserve some clarification. 39
The failure to explain why his analysis leaves open admitting prejudicial evidence also opens him to the attack that
his piece is conceptually flawed. He sees "effect on the truth
determining process" as determined by the probative
value/prejudicial impact variable. Apparently, in Friedman's
view, if evidence is more probative than prejudicial, it has a
positive effect on truth determination; if it is more prejudicial
than probative, it has a negative effect. If so, one would think a
court should never admit prejudicial evidence, although at
times he argues to the contrary. Why he does so is unclear,
thus creating an impression of a conceptual problem.
In one respect, Friedman presses his microeconomic approach quite far. As he recognizes, in certain circumstances the
proponent of hearsay may be in a better position than the opponent to produce the declarant. In a very interesting passage,
Friedman argues that, nonetheless, the court should admit the
hearsay, with the burden on the opponent to produce the declarant. Why should this be done, given that the proponent
could more cheaply produce the declarant? Because "[t]here is
room for a deal between the parties." 4 This is the correct
microeconomic answer, but it flies in the face of a longstanding
tradition. Parties do not have to purchase evidence; evidence is
made available through the discovery process, which is supposed to be cooperative. It is a strength of Friedman's article
36. See, e.g., id. at 738 n.30 and accompanying text.
37. Id. at 783.
38. For this discussion, I am putting aside questions concerning the legislative power to require the admission of such evidence.
39. Friedman alludes to this point in the present version of his paper, see
Friedman, supra note 17, at 782-83, but I think it deserves more development.
40. Id at 768.
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that it calls into question such sacred cows, but he would do
well to anticipate the objections that will be raised.
Moreover, there are objections to be answered other than
those from tradition. In the passage just referred to, Friedman
goes on to examine those cases in which the parties might not
strike a deal, and his analysis seems complete. He then concludes this section by asserting that the court might decide,
even though the hearsay is more probative than prejudicial,
that part of the burden of producing the declarant should be
imposed on the proponent. Friedman concludes by noting that
"[t]he best way to do this depends on the precise
circumstances." 4 1
Indeed it does, and those circumstances are quite complex.
They entail determining whether the proponent is willing to
deal, whether the proponent will attempt to extract too large a
price, and whether transactional costs are too high for a private
deal to be struck.4 2 That the circumstances are complex means
that very difficult and time-consuming processes may be required to make the necessary determinations. Absent from
Friedman's analysis is a satisfactory consideration of judicial
costs. 43 This is striking in the context of a microeconomic argu-

ment, for judicial costs are just as much "costs" as are the parties' costs, and they must be taken into account. In fact, judicial
costs are public subsidies to litigating parties. Friedman's
scheme might increase that subsidy sufficiently to offset the advantage that making the parties bear their own costs in
presenting evidence may achieve. Again, he should explain
why that is not so, and, I think, explain it in detail. While I am
glad to have Professor Friedman's assertion that "decision making under the system I am suggesting need not entail excessive
administrative costs, 4' I would prefer a more intense examination of the question.
One other point needs elaboration. Friedman considers
some of the tactical consequences that his argument entails. In
particular, he discusses the possibility that the increased admissibility of hearsay under his approach creates incentives for the
production of hearsay, which, as he says, might "raise the possi41. I& at 770.
42. I& at 769-70.
43. Although I make the point here due to the complexity of these particular factual determinations, the point itself is a general one. Friedman's argument requires that the judge determine the relative ability of parties to
produce the declarant, and that will be a costly procedure as well.
44. Friedman, supra note 17, at 751.
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bility of trial by affidavit. '45 He does, I think, have adequate
responses to this concern, but he does not examine all the possibly troublesome incentives his proposals might generate. The
most important of these that occurs to me is that his scheme
creates incentives, by creating the means, to shift costs to an
opponent. Remember that Friedman is essentially arguing for
the free admissibility of hearsay, with the opponent bearing any
costs of producing live testimony. If hearsay is generally
cheaper than live testimony, admitting it will transfer the cost
of producing live testimony to the other side. At a Minimum,
Friedman should examine this incentive, which may be at odds
with the settled expectations of who bears costs at trial.
He should also explain why a variation on the race to the
bottom will not occur, or is not a problem if it does. The incentive to shift costs from the proponent to the opponent is
matched by a perfectly reciprocal incentive for the opponent to
shift costs to the proponent by producing rebutting hearsay. If
hearsay is generally not preferred to live testimony, a race to
the bottom occurs.
The closest response to this problem is Friedman's argument that "[i]f the court concludes in the particular case that
the evidence is really more prejudicial than probative, the theory should not allow the evidence."'46 This, though, is not an
adequate response, for the problem emerges from Friedman's
general assumption that hearsay is more probative than prejudicial, and from his arguments for opponents to bear the cost of
responding.
One final clarification and one final comment are in order.
I read Friedman's paper as calling for the expanded use of
hearsay, but his paper is ambiguous in one respect. It bears the
reading I have given it, but it also bears a reading that would
merely superimpose a best evidence rule on top of the present
hearsay rule. At the conference, Friedman distributed a proposed rule, designed to implement his proposals, which demonstrates this ambiguity by leaving open the status of hearsay
when the declarant has been called to testify. His proposed
rule (b)(4) provides that "[i]f the proponent does call the declarant as a witness, admissibility of the hearsay statement
shall not be determined until the declarant first gives his or her
current testimony with respect to the subject matter of the
statement." Missing from this rule are the standards for admis45. Id at 762.
46.

Id at 763.
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sion of the hearsay. If, in his view, they are merely the relevancy requirements, then my reading of his work is intact. If,
however, they are the normal requirements for hearsay, then
all he has done is complicate matters by adding a best evidence
principle that would change the implementation of the availability requirement and apparently make more hearsay subject
to it. Similarly, it would no longer be clear what his analysis
adds, because opponents of hearsay now can call the declarant
if they like. In that case, this paper would collapse to his earlier hearsay paper arguing for procedural reform. 47 Were that
to occur, much to my regret, we would find ourselves diametri-

cally opposed on what to do about hearsay.
The final comment is related to Professor Friedman's paper but is generated by the entire conference at which it was
presented. Other countries already have tried or proposed
many of the suggestions for reform in Friedman's paper, as
well as the reforms proposed by the other presenters. 4 8 Scot-

land has abolished the hearsay rule in civil proceedings, 49 and
the New Zealand Law Commission plans to recommend abolition as well.5° The Irish Law Reform Commission recommended dealing with hearsay through discretionary rulings
similar to those called for by Federal Rule of Evidence 403.51
Scottish law permits the calling of additional witnesses if hearsay is admitted.52 Directly relevant to Friedman's paper, England provides for a notification procedure, which enables the
notifying party to use hearsaysa The Scottish Law Commission
proposed such a procedure, but it was not eriacted because of
concerns about its practicality.5 4 None of this material is cited
in Friedman's paper, nor did it play much of a role in the conference as a whole. This is regrettable. Much of the Englishspeaking world is experimenting with various approaches to
hearsay and many other matters, and we should pay attention
to these developments. Ironically, the Federal Rules of Evi47. Richard D. Friedman, Improving the Procedurefor Resolving Hearsay
Issues, 13 CARDOzO L. REv. 883 (1991). Friedman indicates that his intent is to
"supplant, not supplement, the present hearsay system." Friedman, supra
note 17, at 725 n.7. Several ambiguities remain, however.
48. A wonderful summary of this material is NEw ZEALAND LAw CoMMISSION, PREIMINARY PAPER No. 15, EVIDENCE LAW: HEARSAY (1991).

49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 11.
Id. at 12.
Id at 20-21.
Id. at 22.
Id at 23-24
Id. at 23.
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dence inspired much of this experimentation, but I fear that
our insularity soon may transform us from a leading to an antiquated position, the metaphorical equivalent, perhaps, of our
transformation from the leading creditor to the leading debtor
nation.

